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In 1963, California opened the door for plaintiffs, as users or con-
sumers of a product, to recover from manufacturers or retailers under a
theory of strict liability when a defect in a product causes physical in-
jury.' Other jurisdictions quickly followed California's recognition of
this cause of action and strict products liability is now an accepted cause
of action. The boundaries of a manufacturer's liability, however, are still
developing. 2
In 1968, California allowed a bystander to recover for negligent in-
ffiction of emotional distress.3 Dillon v. Legg established that plaintiffs
could recover for their emotional distress if they witnessed the negligent
infliction of a physical injury to a close relative. 4 At least twelve other
states have followed the lead of California and adopted the holding of
Dillon.5
The courts are now beginning to address the question whether a
plaintiff, who suffers emotional distress from witnessing a defective prod-
uct physically injure another, may recover in strict products liability.6
The courts' responses to the question of recovery have been varied. Some
jurisdictions have found that the plaintiff is a Dillon type bystander even
though the action is one in strict products liability and held that Dillon
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1. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1963).
2. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, Strict Liability to the Consumer, 69 YALE L.J. 1099
(1960).
3. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
4. The court in Dillon established three guidelines to determine whether a plaintiX was fore-
seeable. In addition to requiring that the plaintiff have a close relationship with the victim, the court
indicated that the plaintiff should be physically present at the scene of the accident and have a
contemporaneous and sensory observance of it. Id.
5. These states are Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas and Washington. See Winter, A Tort in
Transition. Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress, ABA Journal at 62, (March, 1984).
6. See, e.g., Rahn v. Gerdts, 119 Ill. App. 3d 781, 455 N.E.2d 807, 74 IMl. Dec. 378 (1983);
Walker v. Clark Equip. Co., 320 N.W.2d 561 (Iowa, 1982); Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 58 11.
App. 3d 349, 374 N.E.2d 683, 15 Ill. Dec. 900 (1978), affd 79 111. 2d. 26, 402 N.E.2d 194, 37 Ill.
Dec. 304 (1980); and Shepard v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 3d 16, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1977).
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applies to strict products liability casesJ Other jurisdictions have refused
to extend Dillon in this way.8 California and one federal court used a
different analytical route and held that the plaintiffs, who would not re-
cover under Dillon, were, nevertheless, users of the defective products
and could recover for the emotional distress caused by witnessing a de-
fective product physically injure another.9 Finally, some courts have
avoided the question and decided the case on other grounds.10
All of the methods of analysis are problematic. When a plaintiff's
emotional injury is caused by witnessing a defective product physically
injure another, it may seem, at first glance, that the only question before
the court is whether Dillon should be applied to a strict products liability
action. This initial assumption is incorrect. The action is one in strict
products liability and in such actions, plaintiffs have traditionally been
referred to as users. '1 In addition to being a user of the defective prod-
uct, the plaintiff who sues for emotional injury caused by witnessing the
physical injury to another may also be a Dillon type bystander. Accord-
ingly, this plaintiff has a dual status, that is, he or she may be both a
Dillon type bystander and a user of the defective product. The courts,
however, have not recognized the existence of the dual status plaintiff
7. See, e.g., Shepard v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 3d 16, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1977).
8. See, e-g., Gnirk v. Ford Motor Co., 572 F. Supp. 1201 (D.S.D. 1983).
9. Id. and Kately v. Wilkinson, 148 Cal. App. 3d 576, 195 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1983).
10. Plummer v. Abbott Labs., 568 F. Supp. 920 (D.R.I. 1983). In Plummer, 51 plaintiffs
brought a strict products liability action against seven manufacturers of DES. Some of these plain-
tiffs alleged that they were suffering emotional distress from the fear of contracting cancer and out of
concern for the future medical problems that their children might encounter as a result of the plain-
tiffs' use of DES. The court ruled that because the plaintiffs did not allege that they had suffered any
physical harm or physical manifestations of their emotional distress, their claim regarding the fear of
a heightened risk of cancer did not state a cause of action.
11. Plaintiffs in strict products liability actions have also been denominated bystanders but the
bystanders in strict liability cases for physical injury are far different from bystanders in a Dillon type
case for neghgent infliction in emotional distress. A good example of a physically injured bystander
would be a pedestrian who is walking down the street and is struck by a car that has defective
brakes. The following fact situations led the courts to classify the physically injured plaintiff as a
bystander in a strict products liability action: a defective car hit the plaintiff who was in a second
car; Williams v. National Trailer Convoy, Inc., 549 F. Supp. 305 (D. Colo. 1982); Sullivan v. Green
Mfg., 118 Ariz. App. 181, 575 P.2d 811 (1978); Mieher v. Brown, 3 Ill. App. 3d 802, 278 N.E.2d.
869 (1972), rev'd on other grounds, 54 Il. 2d 539, 301 N.E.2d 307 (1973); Lamendola v. Mizell, 280
A.2d 241, 115 N.J. Super. 514 (1971); Caruth v. Mariani, 111 Ariz. App. 188, 463 P.2d 83 (1970);
Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 451 P.2d 84 (1969); and
Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630, (Tex. 1969); an out-of-control car ran into a school yard
killing plaintiffs child: Haumerson v. Ford Motor Co. 257 N.W.2d 7 (Iowa 1977); a defective car
exploded causing a dense cloud of gas which restricted visibility and caused plaintiffs' cars to become
involved in a multiple car accident: Giberson v. Ford Motor Co., 504 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. 1974); a child
was run over by a lawn mower: Chrysler Corp. v. Alumbaugh, 168 Ind. App. 363, 342 N.E.2d 908,
modified 168 Ind. App. 383, 348 N.E.2d 654 (1976); Howes v. Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247, 201 N.W.2d
825 (1972); and a Caterpillar grader ran over a woman: West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d
80 (Fla. 1976).
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and have tended to classify the plaintiff as either a Dillon bystander or a
strict products liability user.
The question of the plaintiff's status is more than a mere problem in
semantics because the court's categorization of the plaintiff will affect the
plaintiff's ability to recover. An example will clarify this problem. A bus
full of passengers is involved in an accident and the passengers are physi-
cally injured. If a defect in the bus caused the accident, the passengers
might sue the manufacturer of the bus in strict products liability. These
passengers would fall within the definition of "user" in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.12 As users they could recover for their physical inju-
ries. Now, suppose that the same bus hits a pedestrian and the passen-
gers witness this injury and suffer emotional distress as a result. If the
accident was caused by the negligence of the driver, the passengers could
sue the driver or the bus company for negligent infliction of emotional
distress under Dillon. Even in a jurisdiction that follows Dillon the pas-
sengers would not recover, however, because they fail to meet an element
necessary to recovery under Dillon: they lack a close relationship with
the pedestrian victim. 13 The passengers' recovery for their emotional dis-
tress becomes a more complex question if the bus hits the pedestrian be-
cause of a defect in the bus. The passengers are dual status plaintiffs;
they are both Dillon bystanders and users of the defective product. 14 If
the court defines the passengers as Dillon bystanders, they will not re-
12. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A Comment L (1965) defines a user as:
In order for the rule stated in this Section to apply, it is not necessary that the ultimate user
or consumer have acquired the product directly from the seller, although the rule applies
equally if he does so. He may have acquired it through one or more intermediate dealers.
It is not even necessary that the consumer have purchased the product at all. He may be a
member of the family of the final purchaser, or his employee, or a guest at his table, or a
mere donee from the purchaser. The liability stated is one in tort, and does not require any
contractual relation, or privity of contract, between the plaintiff and the defendant.
"Consumers" include not only those who in fact consume the product but also those who
prepare it for consumption; and the housewife who contracts tularemia while cooking rab-
bits for her husband is included within the rule stated in this Section as is also the husband
who is opening a bottle of beer for his wife to drink. Consumption includes all ultimate
uses for which the product is intended, and the customer in a beauty shop to whose hair a
permanent wave solution is applied by the shop is a consumer. "User" includes those who
are passively enjoying the benefit of the product, as in the case of passengers in automobiles
or airplanes, as well as those who are utilizing it for the purpose of doing work upon it, as
in the case of an employee of the ultimate buyer who is making repairs upon the automo-
bile which he has purchased.
The passengers in the bus in this hypothetical are certainly "passively enjoying the benefit of the
product."
13. The court phrased this prong as "[wihether plaintiff and the accident victim were closely
related, as contrasted with the absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant relation-
ship." Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 740.
14. The passengers' injury is like that suffered by plaintiffs in Dillon type actions but the passen-
gers still fall within the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) ("hereinafter Restate-
ment") definition of a user although their injury is emotional rather than physical.
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cover because they again fail to meet a necessary element, a close rela-
tionship with the victim. If, however, the court defines the passengers as
users, Dillon and its elements would not be applied and the passengers
could recover despite the fact that they have no relationship with the
victim.
In addition, the courts have failed to address the most basic policy
question: whether strict products liability should be extended to cover
this type of harm. Assuming that the plaintiff's status has been properly
determined, the courts must contend with the view that strict products
liability is limited to recovery for physical injury.1 5
After a brief review of the Dillon cause of action and the doctrine of
strict products liability, this article will analyze those cases which have
addressed the question whether q plaintiff may recover in strict products
liability for the emotional distress caused by witnessing a defective prod-
uct physically injure another, and will examine both the dual status
plaintiff and policy questions.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Dillon Cause of Action
In Dillon v. Legg, the Supreme Court of California held that a
mother could recover for the emotional distress caused by witnessing the
death of her young child by the allegedly negligent driving of the defend-
ant. Prior to this time, a plaintiff in the position of Mrs. Dillon could not
recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress unless he or she also
suffered some physical impact or was within the zone of danger. 16 Mrs.
Dillon suffered no physical impact and was not within the zone of dan-
ger. She alleged that the defendant's negligent operation of his car
caused him to collide with her young daughter who was crossing the
15. Section 402A(l) of the Restatement specifies that "One who sells any product in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property .. " (emphasis
added). See also Shepard v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 3d 16, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1977) (Kane, 3.
dissenting).
16. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). Nine states still
adhere to the zone of danger rule: Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska,
Tennnessee, Vermont, and Wisconsin according to W. Winter, A Tort in Transition: Negligent In-
fliction of Mental Distress, ABA JouiRNAL at 64 (March 1984) (Illinois may however have abrogated
the zone of danger requirement in Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 101 Il. App. 3d 439, 428
N.E.2d 596, 57 IMI. Dec. 46 (1981); affd, 98 Ill. 2d. 546, 75 IMI. Dec. 211, 457 N.E.2d 1 (1983). In
addition, according to Mr. Winter's article, eight states still require physical impact. These are
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indians, Kentucky, Mississippi and North Carolina. Other
states have abrogated the impact rule but not in the bystander context: Minnesota, Missouri and
Ohio.
At the time Dillon was decided, California followed the zone of danger rule.
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street. The plaintiff also alleged that she was "in close proximity to the
collision and personally witnessed said collision." 17  This, according to
the plaintiff, caused her "great emotional disturbance and shock and in-
jury to her nervous system which caused her great physical and mental
pain and suffering." 18
In finding that Mrs. Dillon could recover, the court rejected the ar-
gument that allowing plaintiffs such as Mrs. Dillon to recover would lead
to either fraudulent or indefinable claims. The court also held that Mrs.
Dillon was a foreseeable plaintiff. "Surely the negligent driver who
causes the death of a young child may reasonably expect that the mother
will not be far distant and will upon witnessing the accident suffer emo-
tional trauma."' 19 The court then set forth three guidelines for determin-
ing whether a plaintiff, such as Mrs. Dillon, was foreseeable:20
(1) whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident
as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it;21
(2) whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact
upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of
the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others
after its occurrence;22
(3) whether plaintiff and the accident victim were closely re-
lated, as contrasted with the absence of any such relationship or the
presence of only a distant relationship. 23
The court's holding was, at least in part, based on the fact that the
action was one for negligence and based on the fault of the defendant.
The court noted:
In the absence of the primary liability of the tort-feasor for the death of
the child, we see no ground for an independent and secondary liability
for claims for injuries by third parties. The basis for such claims must
be adjudicated liability and fault of defendant; that liability and fault
must be the foundation for the tort-feasor's duty of due care to third
17. Dillon, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 81.
20. The court indicated that these three elements were only guidelines. This article does not
address the difficulty of applying these three elements or whether they have, indeed, been applied
rigidly to become more of a test than guidelines. For examples of application of the Dillon elements,
See, e.g., Nazaroff v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 3d 553, 145 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1978) (mother heard
and arrived to see her child being pulled from a swimming pool was allowed to recover); Krouse v.
Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863, 562 P.2d 1022 (1977) (husband who was near family car
sensed but did not actually see vehicle hit his wife was allowed to recover); Arauz v. Gerhardt, 68
Cal. App. 3d 937, 137 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1977) (child injured in car accident but mother who arrived on
scene some minutes later not allowed to recover); and Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d
253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969) (mother who arrived within moments after her child was injured in
explosion was allowed to recover).
21. Hereinafter referred to as the physically present element.
22. Hereinafter referred to as the sensory observance element.
23. Hereinafter referred to as the close relationship element.
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parties who, as a consequence of such negligence, sustain emotional
trauma.
24
Accordingly, after Dillon, in many jurisdictions, a plaintiff may recover
for the negligent infliction of emotional distress if the three prong test of
Dillon is met.
B. Strict Products Liability
Strict products liability was recognized in Greenman v. Yuba. 25
Prior to this decision, strict products liability was not a widely accepted
theory. According to the Comments to Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, strict products liability had first been extended to
products intended for intimate bodily contact. The Comments note that
Michigan, in 1958, was the first state to abrogate this limit and apply
strict products liability to any product, which, if defective, could be ex-
pected to cause physical harm to the user or consumer or the user's prop-
erty.26 After Greenman, however, plaintiffs could recover from a
manufacturer for physical injuries caused by a defective product without
establishing that the manufacturer was at fault.
Perhaps the most frequently cited definition of this cause of action
is:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective2 7 condition unreasona-
bly dangerous 28 to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
24. Dillon v. Legg, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
25. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897
(1963).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment b (1965) (hereinafter referred to as
"RESTATEMENT").
27. The RESTATEMENT, in Comment g defines defective condition:
The rule stated in this Section applies only where the product is, at the time it leaves the
seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be
unreasonably dangerous to him. The seller is not liable when he delivers the product in a
safe condition, and subsequent mishandling or other causes make it harmful by the time it
is consumed. The burden of proof that the product was in a defective condition at the time
that it left the hands of the particular seller is upon the injured plaintiff; and unless evi-
dence can be produced which will support the conclusion that it was then defective, the
burden is not sustained.
Safe condition at the time of delivery by the seller will, however, include proper packaging,
necessary sterilization, and other precautions required to permit the product to remain safe
for a normal length of time when handled in a normal manner.
The RESTATEMENT gives examples of a defective condition as harmful ingredients, foreign objects
and dangerous containers. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A Comment h (1965).
28. Unreasonably dangerous is explained in the RESTATEMENT, Comment i, as:
The rule stated in this Section applies only where the defective condition of the product
makes it unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. Many products cannot possibly
be made entirely safe for all consumption, and any food or drug necessarily involves some
risk of harm, if only from over-consumption. Ordinary sugar is a deadly poison to diabet-
ics, and castor oil found use under Mussolini as an instrument of torture. This is not what
is meant by 'unreasonably dangerous' in this Section. The article sold must be dangerous
to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
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liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate consumer, or
to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 402A(l) (emphasis added).
Regardless of whether the plaintiff in this type of action is classified
as a Dillon bystander or a user in strict products liability language, the
Restatement limits liability to actions for physical injury.29 The physical
injury limitation of the Restatement may present a real obstacle to plain-
tiffs seeking to recover for emotional distress, and will be discussed in
more detail later.
In addition, the explicit language of the Restatement limits recovery
to users or consumers. The American Law Institute expressed no opin-
ion as to whether the section should apply to "harm to persons other
than users or consumers."' 30 The limitation of the Restatement to users
of the product does not present a problem to plaintiffs seeking to recover
for their emotional distress in strict products liability; even if the plain-
tiffs are classified as Dillon bystanders and are not, in fact, users, due to
developments in the doctrine after the drafting of the Restatement.
The historical development of strict products liability has greatly
influenced the ability of a plaintiff to recover for emotional distress for
witnessing a defective product physically injure another. Strict products
liability began as an action for breach of warranty requiring privity of
contract between the plaintiff and the manufacturer, and later developed
into a cause of action for breach of implied warranty without regard to
privity of contract. 31 This warranty action then developed into the pres-
ent day strict products liability action which the Restatement indicates
purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteris-
tics. Good whiskey is not unreasonably dangerous merely because it will make some peo-
ple drunk, and is especially dangerous to alcoholics; but bad whiskey, containing a
dangerous amount of fuel oil, is unreasonably dangerous. Good tobacc, is not unreasona-
bly dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be harmful; but tobacco contain-
ing something like marijuana may be unreasonably dangerous. Good butter is not
unreasonably dangerous merely because, if such be the case, it deposits cholesterol in the
arteries and leads to heart attacks; but bad butter, contaminated with poisonous fish oil is
unreasonably dangerous.
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965).
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A Comment on Caveat 0 (1965).
31. Note, Strict Products Liability to the Bystander: A Study in Common Law Determinism, 38
U. CHi. L. REV. 625 (1971).
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will lie without regard to privity.32 The use of the term user in the Re-
statement, as well as its caveat regarding recovery by non-users, is appar-
ently a holdover from the old requirement of privity between the plaintiff
and the defendant.
In 1969 the courts began to address the question whether a non-user
of a product, a strict products liability bystander,33 could recover for
physical injury caused by a defective product. In Elmore v. American
Motors Corp.,34 a defect in the defendant's car caused the drive shaft to
fall, which caused plaintiff's car to swerve to avoid hitting it and the
plaintiff was injured. The plaintiff sued the manufacturer of the defend-
ant's car. 35 The Supreme Court of California labelled the plaintiff a by-
stander and held that the plaintiff could recover in strict products
liability. To reach this holding, the court first addressed the traditional
view that limited recovery to users of a defective product. It rejected this
traditional view and accepted the notion that privity has no place in strict
products liability and that bystanders, such as the plaintiffs in Elmore,
should recover for their physical injuries. 36 Indeed, the court reasoned
that a bystander might, in fact, need more protection than a user because
a bystander has no opportunity to test the safety of the product and was
indeed, an innocent victim.
The holding of Elmore is widely, if not universally, followed in other
jurisdictions. 37 Accordingly, non-users can recover when they are physi-
cally injured by a defective product. As will be discussed below, how-
ever, it is less clear whether non-users (or even users) can recover when
they are emotionally injured by a defective product.
III. THE CASES
Several jurisdictions have now addressed the question whether a
plaintiff may recover in strict products liability for witnessing a defective
product physically injure another. Some of the jurisdictions have classi-
fied the plaintiffs in these cases as Dillon type bystanders and then gone
on to decide whether to extend Dillon to strict products liability. Two
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(b) (1965).
33. The physically injured bystander was at issue here as opposed to the bystander in a Dillon
case for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
34. 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969).
35. These facts are taken from the appellate court decision, Waters v. American Motors, 69
Cal. Rptr. 799 (Cal. App. 1968). The opinion of the supreme court does not contain facts sufficient
to understand who was the physically injured bystander.
36. W. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel Strict Liability to the Consumer, 69 YALE L.J.
1099 (1960) and Note, Strict Products Liability to the Bystanders A Study in Common Law Deter-
minism, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 625 (1971).
37. See cases cited at note 11, supra.
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courts, after finding that the plaintiffs could not recover under Dillon,
went on to a second step, and defined the dual status plaintiffs as users
and found that, as users, the plaintiffs could recover for their emotional
distress.
A. The Dillon Approach
Parker v. Chemical Way Company38 was one of the first cases to
address whether Dillon applied to strict products liability actions. Mr.
Parker had purchased a container of drain opener that exploded. His
wife found him, presumably physically injured by the explosion, shortly
after the accident occurred. The Parkers sued the manufacturer of the
drain opener in strict products liability. While the husband could re-
cover for his physical injury, the California Court of Appeals held, with
little explanation, that the wife could not recover in strict products liabil-
ity for the emotional distress she suffered by viewing her husband's in-
jury. The court could have been trying to limit Dillon to negligence
cases. Another possibility is that the court felt that while Dillon could be
extended to strict products liability, the wife did not meet the three prong
test of Dillon because she was either not physically present at the time of
the accident, or did not have a sensory observance of the injury to her
husband at the time of the explosion. This latter explanation is more
likely, because one year later, the California court, in Shepard v. Superior
Court39 defined the plaintiffs as Dillon bystanders and allowed them to
recover for their emotional distress in a strict products liability case.
The facts of Shepard presented a compelling case for recovery. Mr.
and Mrs. Shepard and their two children were riding in the family car
when a serious accident occurred involving a second car. One of the
Shepard children was thrown from the car and was run over and killed
by the second car. The parents and surviving child sued the manufac-
turer of their own car, alleging that the deceased child was thrown from
the car because of a defect in that car. The Shepards met the three prong
test of Dillon and the court held that the plaintiffs could recover for the
emotional distress caused by witnessing the death of a family member.
The court reasoned that it would make no sense to permit recovery
against a negligent driver, as in Dillon, while denying recovery from the
manufacturer responsible for the defective condition. According to the
court, its "conclusion is in consonance with the stated purpose of the
courts in adopting strict liability, i.e., to relieve the plaintiffs from
38. Parker v. Standard Chemical Way Co., 60 Cal. App. 3d 47, 131 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1976).
39. 76 Cal. App. 3d 16, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1977).
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problems of proof inherent in negligence and warranty remedies, and
thereby to 'insure that the costs of injury resulting from defective prod-
ucts are borne by the manufacturer.' "40
The majority of the court in Shepard provided no other explanation
for extending the Dillon cause of action to strict products liability. It did
not mention the Restatement's limitation to cases involving physical
harm. Further, it did not address the plaintiffs' status as both Dillon type
bystanders and users within the Restatement definition of that term.
The dissent noted that while California had a history of allowing
recovery for emotional distress in negligence and intentional tort cases, it
raised a question not dealt with by the majority-whether such damages
should be recoverable when the manufacturer's conduct is not culpable.
The dissent went on to note that one of the rationales behind the holding
in Dillon was the fault of the defendant. In addition, the dissent voiced
the opinion that a manufacturer was not an insurer and that a balance
was needed between a plaintiff's ability to recover and the continuing
viability of defendant's enterprise.4'
At least one other jurisdiction has explicitly held that a Dillon type
bystander may recover in strict products liability. In Walker v. Clark
Equipment42 the Iowa court extended Dillon to actions brought under a
strict products liability theory. One year earlier, that court had held that
a bystander could recover in Dillon negligence cases, that is, Iowa
adopted Dillon.43 In Walker, the court could see "no qualitative differ-
ence once liability is found, between recoveries under theories of negli-
gence, strict liability or warranty." 44 There was no way a line could be
drawn between the three causes of action according to the Iowa court
and it reasoned that once a defendant is liable, a plaintiff should recover
all damages. In terms of compensability the emotional injury to the
plaintiff was to be treated as the equivalent of physical injury. Like the
majority in Shepard, the Iowa court did not address whether the defend-
ant's culpability was a factor to be considered in extending Dillon to
strict products liability cases.
The Illinois Appellate Court, however, has rejected the idea that
40. 76 Cal. App. 3d at 21, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 615, quoting Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal.
3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 403 (1972).
41. 76 Cal. App. 3d at 31, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 622.
42. 320 N.W.2d 561 (Iowa 1982). This is the only case discussed in this article in which the
plaintiff was a single status plaintiff, that is, she was only a Dillon type bystander because she did not
fall with the RESTATEMENT definition of a user. In Walker, Carl Walker was operating a forklift
that turned over and he was killed. The plaintiff was Carl's sister who was a witness to the accident.
43. Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981).
44. 320 N.W.2d at 563.
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Dillon bystanders can recover in strict products liability. In Woodill v.
Parke Davis & Co. ,45 the court held that emotional distress, unaccompa-
nied by physical injury, was not compensable in strict products liability.
The plaintiff, while hospitalized as an obstetrical patient, was treated
with a drug manufactured by the defendant. Plaintiff later gave birth to
a son and sued the drug manufacturer on behalf of her son for his injury
and for the emotional distress that she suffered as a result of the injury to
her infant son. The court rejected plaintiff's claim for emotional distress
and held that strict liability should not be extended to cover this type of
injury because § 402A expressly limits recovery to cases involving physi-
cal harm.
This view was upheld three years later in Rahn v. Gerdts despite
the fact that in the interim between Woodill and Rahn, the Illinois court
had adopted Dillon in a negligence case, Rickey v. Chicago Transit Au-
thority.47 In Rahn, however, the court refused to extend Dillon to strict
products liability cases and noted that Dillon and its adoption in Rickey
were grounded on policy considerations related to the nature of the de-
fendant's conduct and on the element of foreseeability present in a negli-
gence action.
B. The Two Tier Approach
Two courts have gone further in their analysis of cases than those
mentioned above. Both courts first determined that the plaintiffs, as Dil-
lon bystanders, could not recover, but then defined the plaintiffs as users
of the product and held that, as users, the plaintiffs could recover for the
emotional distress caused by witnessing a defective product physically
injure another.
In Gnirk v. Ford Motor Co.48 the United States District Court for
the District of South Dakota held that South Dakota would not extend
Dillon to strict products liability cases. Plaintiff, the driver of a defective
car, got out of her car to open a gate while her young son remained in the
car. While the plaintiff was outside her car, she witnessed the death of
her son when the car's gears shifted into reverse, the car struck a post
and the car, containing her child, was propelled into a dam. The court,
apparently using the Restatement's definition, held that the plaintiff was
45. 58 IlM. App. 3d 349, 374 N.E.2d 683, 15 Ill. Dec. 900 (1978), affd 791Il. 2d 26,402 N.E. 2d
194, 37 M. Dec. 304 (1980).
46. 119 IH. App. 3d 781, 455 N.E.2d 807, 74 M. Dec. 378 (1983).
47. 101 Ill. App. 3d 439, 428 N.E.2d 596, 57 IlM. Dec. 46 (1981), affid, 98 IM. 2d 546, 457
N.E.2d 1, 75 Ill. Dec. 211 (1983).
48. 572 F. Supp. 1201 (D.S.D. 1983).
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a user of the car and that the manufacturer owed her an independent
legal duty. Therefore, despite the court's holding regarding Dillon, the
plaintiff, as a user, was permitted to recover for her emotional distress.
California also used this two tier analysis in Kately v. Wilkinson.49
In Kately, the California Court of Appeals reaffirmed its decision in
Shepard that Dillon could be extended to strict products liability cases
but noted that the plaintiffs in Kately failed to meet the three prong test
of Dillon. The court went on, however, to find that the plaintiffs were
users who could recover for emotional distress.
The plaintiffs in Kately were a mother, Mrs. Kately, and her four-
teen year old daughter, Rebecca. The plaintiffs, along with Rhonda, a
fourteen year old friend of Rebecca's, were using the Kately's boat for
waterskiing. Rhonda was waterskiing when the boat's steering column
locked and she was run over by the boat's propeller. The plaintiffs were
eventually able to get Rhonda, who was critically injured, into the boat
but the locked steering column prevented them from getting the boat to
shore to obtain the necessary medical help. Rhonda died on the boat.
Mrs. Kately and Rebecca sued the manufacturer of the boat for the emo-
tional distress caused by witnessing the horrifying death of Rhonda.50
In one of the claims for relief, the Katelys alleged that the boat had
been negligently manufactured and that they suffered negligent infliction
of emotional distress as a result, a Dillon negligence claim. The court
found that the plaintiffs could not recover under Dillon because they
failed the close relationship prong of Dillon. The only way around this
obstacle would have been for the court to abrogate this element by en-
larging it to include social relationships that are as close as familial ones.
This court refused to enlarge the Dillon cause of action to include non-
family members.5 1
49. 148 Cal. App. 3d 576, 195 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1983).
50. The Katelys brought eight causes of action in all as follows:
The first cause of action was for rescission of the contract of sale of the boat on the ground
of intentional misrepresentation; the second was for compensatory damages for negligent
misrepresentation; and the third was for exemplary damages for intentional misrepresenta-
tion. The fourth cause of action was for negligence in the manufacture of the boat; the fifth
was for breach of express warranty; the sixth was for breach of warranty of
merchantability; the seventh was for products liability; and the eighth was for negligent
infliction of emotional distress caused by Kately's witnessing the death of plaintiffs daugh-
ter, Rhonda, a person Kately considered as a daughter. The damages alleged in the fourth
through seventh causes of action were emotional and mental damages resulting from the
death of Rhonda as to whom there existed a relationship akin to that of a mother and
daughter with Rhonda.
148 Cal. App. 3d at 579, 195 Cal. Rptr. 903, n.3.
51. Some courts have enlarged the requirement that the plaintiff have a close relationship with
the victim although none have gone so far as to totally eliminate it. See, eg., Leong v. Takasaki, 55
Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974).
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The court then turned to Mrs. Kately's alternative claim that her
injuries were not bystander injuries governed by Dillon but were the di-
rect result of the defective product. The court phrased the issue as
whether a user of a defective product can recover damages for emotional
trauma that the user sustains through sensory perception of an injury to
another caused by the defect in the product she is using.
In order to resolve this question, the court first relied on Shepard to
find that a plaintiff can recover for emotional distress in strict products
liability. The court then relied on a negligence case, Molien v. Kaiser
Foundation Hospitals52 to avoid applying the limitations of Dillon to Mrs.
Kately's strict products liability claim.
In Molien, a physician had misdiagnosed a woman as having a vene-
real disease. The woman's husband sued the physician, claiming that the
negligent misdiagnosis had caused him emotional distress. If the court
had applied Dillon to the facts of Molien the husband could not have
recovered because he failed to meet either the physically present or the
sensory observance element. In order to avoid the application of the Dil-
lon elements, the court adopted a new test in Molien, that of directness of
the injury. If the injury was direct, the three prong test of Dillon was not
controlling. Direct injuries were defined as "those in which the defend-
ant's negligence is foreseeably directed toward the person asserting the
claim for emotional distress."'5 3
The Kately court applied Molien and found that the injury to Mrs.
Kately was direct. The manufacturer of the boat should have reasonably
foreseen that the purchaser and operator of a defective boat would suffer
emotional distress when the boat malfunctioned and killed or injured
another.
The user of a defective product is not a mere bystander but a pri-
mary and direct victim of the product defect; this is true whether the
defective product directly and immediately injures the user or severely
harms another while being operated by the user; it is equally true
whether the user suffers physical or emotional injuries.54
In addition, the emotional distress suffered by a user was foreseeable re-
gardless of the relationship between Mrs. Kately and the victim.
The court then considered Rebecca's claim. The court first noted
that a mere passenger in a defective vehicle was not a "user who would
foreseeably suffer emotional injuries..." when the product defect causes
52. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
53. 148 Cal. App. 3d at 586, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 908.
54. 148 Cal. App. 3d at 588, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 909.
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severe injury or death to a third party.55 The court found, however, that
Rebecca was more than a mere passenger. Relying on a state statute that
required the presence of a person over the age of twelve to observe the
towed skier, the court labelled Rebecca a user of the defective product.
She was given the opportunity to amend her complaint to allege that
because of this statute her presence in the boat was reasonably foresee-
able, that it was foreseeable that she would witness injury to the water
skier for whom she was the responsible observer, and that her feelings of
guilt and responsibility would be severe notwithstanding her knowledge
of the actual cause of the injury.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Status of the Plaintiffs
As the cases discussed above reveal, the courts have taken various
positions on the question whether a plaintiff may recover in strict prod-
ucts liability for the emotional distress caused by witnessing a defective
product physically injure another. The results may be summarized as
follows:
1. In two cases, Walker and Shepard, the courts held that the
plaintiffs were Dillon bystanders, that Dillon applied to strict products
liability, and because the plaintiffs met the three prong test of Dillon, the
plaintiffs could recover.
2. One jurisdiction, Illinois, held in Woodill and Rahn, that Dillon
was inapplicable in strict products liability cases. The plaintiffs in both
cases, however, could have been defined as strict products liability users
but the court did not take this approach.
3. In Gnirk, the United States District Court for the District of
South Dakota held that while South Dakota would not extend Dillon to
strict products liability cases, the plaintiff was a user who could recover
for her emotional distress.
4. California, in Kately, held that users, who witness injury to an-
other, may recover for the emotional distress they suffer as a result.
These cases also reveal that a plaintiff classified as a Dillon by-
stander will recover for emotional distress in strict products liability if
that jurisdiction had adopted Dillon in negligence cases and decides to
extend it to strict products liability, and if the plaintiff meets the three
prong test of Dillon. In a jurisdiction that does not follow Dillon, or one
that refuses to extend it to strict products liability, or if the jurisdiction
55. Id.
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follows Dillon but the plaintiff does not meet the three prong test of Dil-
lon, the plaintiff may still recover for emotional distress in strict products
liability if the plaintiff is also a user. Plaintiffs are most likely to recover
if they can convince the court to label them Dillon bystanders and as
users and follow a two step approach.56 That is, first analyze the case
under Dillon and then, if Dillon is held not to apply to strict products
liability or if the plaintiff fails to meet the three prong test, to proceed to
a second step and assess whether the plaintiff, as a user of the defective
product, can recover for emotional distress.
This two step approach has obvious advantages for plaintiffs. First,
it affords plaintiffs an additional theory of recovery. The two step
method is especially helpful to plaintiffs who do not meet the three prong
test of Dillon, or who find themselves in jurisdictions that either decline
to follow Dillon or to extend it to strict products liability cases. Under
the two step method the court does not have to follow one method to the
exclusion of the other. This choice leaves the parties with little ability to
anticipate the court's decision and, therefore, little ability to assess the
likelihood of plaintiff's success.
At first glance, this approach may seem unfair to defendants. How-
ever, it is not as unfair as it seems. Plaintiffs often seek to recover under
different theories and the two tier approach is merely another example.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a plaintiff to plead inconsis-
tent theories and a plaintiff who argues for a two tier approach is merely
seeking alternative avenues of recovery. With proper instructions, both
theories could be presented to a jury with minimal confusion. 7
There are two reasons why a court may not use the two tier method.
The court may not recognize that the plaintiff is also a user of the prod-
uct. In addition, and more important, the courts may be reluctant to
designate the plaintiff as a user because of the broad definition of that
term in strict liability cases for physical injury.58 If a court designates
56. No court has used merely the "user" approach to the exclusion of determining whether
Dillon was applicable although courts have applied Dillon without determining whether the plaintiff
was also a user of the product.
57. The court could instruct the jury to determine whether the elements of Dillon were met by
the plaintiff. The jury could also be asked to determine whether the plaintiff met the definition of
user in that jurisdiction or in the RESTATEMENT. The court could use this second determination if it
has decided not to apply Dillon or if the plaintiff does not meet the three prong test of Dillon.
58. Neither of the two articles that address whether a plaintiff may recover in strict products
liability for the emotional distress caused by witnessing a defective product physically injure another
address this problem. In P. Joseph, Dillon's Other Leg: The Extension of the Doctrine Which Per-
mits Bystander Recovery for Emotional Trauma and Physical Injuries to Actions Based on Strict Lia-
bility in Tort, 18 DUQ. L. REv. 1 (1979), the author argues that Dillon should be extended to strict
products liability cases. The article does not address, however, how courts should deal with plain-
tiffs who are injured in this manner but who are also users of the product. Although the author is
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the plaintiff as a user in strict products liability cases, the court may open
the door to recovery by plaintiffs that we do not wish to protect. The
court may therefore find it easier to address the issue by asking only
whether Dillon applies to strict products liability cases. Judicial reluc-
tance to grapple with the difficult question of which users may recover
for emotional distress in strict products liability may explain the court's
holding in Shepard.
In Shepard, the court referred to the plaintiffs, the driver and pas-
sengers of a defective car who witnessed the death of a family member in
a car accident, as Dillon bystanders and extended Dillon to strict prod-
ucts liability cases. The court recognized a new cause of action by ex-
tending Dillon to strict products liability cases, rather than categorize the
plaintiffs as users even though the plaintiffs fit within the Restatement's
definition of users. If the court had chosen to define the plaintiffs as
users, the court would have had to find a way to limit its holding to
exclude some of the users that fall within the Restatement's broad defini-
tion of that term.
Recall the hypothetical of the passengers on the bus that hit a pedes-
trian, causing the passengers who witnessed it to suffer emotional dis-
tress. If the accident was caused by the negligence of the driver and the
passengers sued using a Dillon negligence theory, they would not recover
because they fail to meet the close relationship prong of the Dillon test.
If, however, the accident was caused by a defect in the bus, the passen-
gers could sue in strict products liability. If the court defined the plain-
tiffs as Dillon bystanders, they still could not recover. If, however, the
court defined these dual status plaintiffs as users, the passengers could, at
least in theory, recover. The anomalous result points out the necessity of
redefining the term user. Although the emotional distress suffered by the
bus passengers by witnessing injury to a total stranger may not present a
compelling case for recovery, there are users who are unable to recover
under Dillon, but who should be allowed to recover. Consider the
also of the opinion that there are some difficulties in extending Dillon to strict products liability, such
as lack of precedent, floodgates of litigation and the possibility of a fraud on the court, he does not
mention the problem that courts will face in cases involving a dual status plaintiff. In addition, the
article states that the three prong test of Dillon provides enough controls to resolve any difficulties in
extending Dillon to strict products liability. While Dillon may indeed resolve some of these
problems, California, in Kately v. Wilkinson, has ruled that Dillon does not always control in strict
products liability cases. In Note, Emotional Distremss in Products Liability: Distinguishing Users from
Bystanders, 50 FoRDHAm L. REv. 291 (1981), the author noted that many plaintiffs who were classi-
fied as bystanders were also users of the product. The author argued that these plaintiffs should have
been classified as users to effectuate recovery. The author, however, did not address the problem
that the courts would face in categorizing the plaintiffs as users. Once the court classified these
plaintiffs as users, they would have had to redefine or limit the RsrATEMEVr's broad definition of
that term to exclude the hypothetical passengers on the bus.
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Shepards, for example. If that case arose in a jurisdiction that declines to
follow Dillon, and the two tier approach was not used, the Shepards
would not have been able to recover.
By implicitly redefining the term user, the Kately court attempted to
resolve the anomalous results discussed above. 59 To reiterate, the plain-
tiffs in Kately were a mother and daughter who witnessed the tragic
death of the daughter's friend, Rhonda, while waterskiing. As Dillon
bystanders, the plaintiffs could not recover because they failed to meet
the close relationship prong of the Dillon test and the court refused to
make an exception to that element. The court went on, however, to ana-
lyze the plaintiffs as users of the defective product who had sustained
emotional injury while using the product. Once the court defined the
plaintiffs as users not subject to the three prong test of Dillon, the court
had to find a way to limit its holding to exclude the hypothetical passen-
gers on the bus.
In order to accomplish this, the court relied on the Molien test of
foreseeability, that of directness. According to the court, if Mrs. Kately's
injuries were "a direct result of the use of the defective product" as op-
posed to "her status at the scene of the accident,"w6 she could recover.
The court concluded that Mrs. Kately's injury was direct. With little
explanation, the court found that the defendants:
[S]hould reasonably have foreseen that Kately, as the purchaser and an
operator of the defective boat, would suffer emotional distress when
the boat malfunctioned and killed or injured another human being....
It is clearly predictable that the user of a defective product will feel
guilt and responsibility for the injury or death of another notwith-
standing that the actual cause was the malfunction of the product he
was using. Such feelings of guilt and responsibility are foreseeably an
integral part of resultant emotional distress and suffering caused by the
product malfunction. 61
In this manner, the court redefined the definition of user and limited
the Restatement's definition. Although the redefinition is subtle and dif-
ficult to articulate, the court did distinguish Mrs. Kately from the hypo-
thetical passengers on the bus. The court did this by focusing on Mrs.
Kately's position as the operator of the boat who was responsible for the
safe operation of the boat as well as the safety of the passengers. Unlike
the bus passengers, Mrs. Kately was doing more than "passively enjoying
the benefits of the product" 62 and could recover for her emotional
59. See the RESTATEMENT definition of user, supra note 13.
60. 148 Cal. App. 3d at 587, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 909.
61. Id. at 587-88.
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment 1 (1965).
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distress.
The court's discussion of Rebecca's case, further illustrates the im-
portance of Mrs. Kately's position as the operator of a defective boat.
Although Rebecca falls within the Restatement's definition of a user, the
court explicitly held that Rebecca, as a mere passenger, was not a user
who would foreseeably suffer emotional distress when the defective prod-
uct caused injury to a third party. This holding clearly excludes recovery
by the hypothetical bus passengers. The court went on to add, however,
that the daughter could be a user who would foreseeably suffer emotional
distress by noting the existence of a California statute that requires that a
person over the age of twelve be present on the boat to observe the towed
skier. Rebecca was given an opportunity to amend her complaint to al-
lege that it was:
[R]easonably foreseeable that the boat would be used to tow a water-
skier and, in that event, there would necessarily be a second person in
that boat who had a responsibility of care to the victim and who was
actively involved in the control and safe operation of the boat. It was
certainly foreseeable that Rebecca, who undertook this duty, would
witness an injury to the water-skier. Moreover, it was foreseeable that
she also would suffer emotional distress from witnessing injury to the
skier for whom she was the responsible observer and that her feelings
of guilt and responsibility would be severe notwithstanding her knowl-
edge that the actual cause of the injury, i.e., was the malfunction of the
boat. 63
Accordingly, Rebecca could recover if she was more than a mere passen-
ger on the boat. By being responsible, in some way, for the safe opera-
tion of the boat, Rebecca's status changed from mere passenger to a user
who could foreseeably suffer emotional distress from a defective product.
It appears from Kately that users who are either responsible for the
safe operation of the product, or who are actively involved in the opera-
tion of that product, are users who can recover for emotional distress
caused by witnessing that product physically injure another. It is also
apparent that not all users will fit this new definition. While it may be
easy to say that some users were responsible for the safe operation of the
product, the Kately court's limited definition of a user will prove difficult
to apply to other plaintiffs.
Applying Kately literally would exclude recovery by hypothetical
passengers who witness injury to a stranger; the court's new definition of
a user would allow the driver of the bus to recover. The driver is respon-
sible for the safe operation of the bus and unlike the passengers, would
have been doing more than passively enjoying the benefits of the product.
63. 148 Cal. App. 3d at 588-89, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 910 (emphasis added).
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It is unclear how the Kately court would have dealt with the prob-
lem if, in addition to the two Katelys, another person over the age of
twelve had been present on the boat. The court allowed Rebecca to re-
cover based on a statute that requires only one person to observe the
towed skier. If the court's holding regarding Rebecca is strictly con-
strued, only the person designated as the responsible observer under the
statute could recover, although all those present on the boat would have
witnessed the same injury. The facts could be confounded even further if
one imagines that the additional persons on the boat took turns observing
the towed skier. Because the statute only requires one person to observe,
the manufacturer could reasonably foresee only that two persons would
be users responsible for the safe operation of the boat, the operator and
the statutory observer.
In future cases, the court will have to draw very fine distinctions
between those users who are responsible for the safety of the victim or
the safe operation of the vehicle and other users. Kately hints at one way
to draw those lines. While the court analyzed the case in terms of the
directness of the injury, much of the discussion of the facts reveals the
court's concern with the intimate and personal contact that the Katelys
had with the critically injured water skier.64 Neither of the Katelys
merely observed the injury to Rhonda, they participated in trying to save
her. This active involvement by the Katelys may help the court in future
cases to distinguish plaintiffs like the Katelys from other users. The sug-
gestion in Kately that plaintiffs may recover if they are responsible for the
safe operation of the product and also actively aid the injured victim
could be used to bar recovery by the driver of the bus who witnessed the
bus injure another. Although the driver of the bus is responsible for the
64. The court's recitation of the facts was as follows:
While Rhonda was being towed as a skier, the steering column on the boat locked.
This made it impossible to steer the boat. As a result the boat circled in the water and
struck Rhonda's body.
The impact with the boat partially dismembered Rhonda's leg, the leg being three-
quarters severed from her body. Additionally, the impact tore deep lacerations in
Rhonda's breast area; it tore a deep laceration in her abdomen, resulting in partial eviscera-
tion; it also tore a deep laceration in the groin area and five deep lacerations in Rhonda's
left thigh and leg.
Kately was operating the boat at the time the steering column locked, causing the
impact with Rhonda. At the same time Kately's daughter, Rebecca, was in the back of the
boat observing Rhonda while the boat was towing her. After the impact, Kately and Re-
becca climbed into the water to aid Rhonda, and they succeeded in pulling her back into
the boat. In the course of the rescue, Rebecca inadvertently thrust her hand into Rhonda's
body through one of her wounds. Rhonda was still alive when she was pulled from the
water, but because of the locked steering column, Kately was unable to operate the boat.
Kately and Rebecca were compelled to sit with Rhonda in her badly mutilated condition as
the boat circled in the water. Rhonda died as a result of her injuries.
148 Cal. App. 3d at 580, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
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safe operation of the bus, it is unclear from the Kately decision whether
the driver could recover if he observed the accident but did nothing
more. It is arguable that Kately is limited to its unique facts.
In addition to the problem of distinguishing which plaintiffs fall
within the Kately court's new definition of a user, the Kately approach
will also produce anomalous results. Attempting to apply Kately to the
facts in Shepard demonstrates the difficulties inherent in the approach
taken in Kately. The plaintiffs in Shepard were defined as Dillon bystand-
ers and could recover because the court decided that Dillon was applica-
ble in strict products liability and that all of the plaintiffs met the three
prong test of Dillon. All of the plaintiffs in Shepard fall within the Re-
statement's definition of user, but all of them would not meet the new
definition of user implicitly announced in Kately. The driver of the car,
Mr. Shepard, was the operator of the car and stood in the position of
Mrs. Kately in terms of his responsibility for the safe operation of the
vehicle. Applying Kately, it would be reasonably foreseeable that Mr.
Shepard would suffer emotional distress when the car malfunctioned and
his child was killed. As in Kately, it would be predictable that Mr. Shep-
ard, as the operator user of the defective product, would feel guilt and
responsibility for the death regardless of the fact that the actual cause of
the death was the car's malfunction. The rest of the Shepards, however,
were not operating the car and are, in Kately terms, mere passengers.
There is no statute, as there was in Kately, that required their presence or
that would make them responsible in any way for the safe operation of
the car. The Kately approach would allow Mr. Shepard to recover as the
driver of the car but would deny recovery by the remainder of the
family.65
Therefore, although the Kately court recognized the problem of the
dual status plaintiff and tried to limit the Restatement's broad definition
of user, application of Kately in future cases may prove unworkable. If a
court takes the two tier approach and categorizes the plaintiff first as a
Dillon bystander, the plaintiff who can recover will avoid the problems
inherent in Kately. Those plaintiffs who cannot recover under Dillon will
have a chance of recovering as users, but the outcome is far from certain.
The one other court that took the two tier approach held that users
could recover for the emotional distress caused by witnessing a defective
product physically injure another did not attempt to limit the Restate-
65. As all of the Shepards met the Dillon test, the application of Kately is largely academic. If
however, the Shepard case had arisen in a jurisdiction that either refused to follow Dillon or to
extend it to strict products liability, this would be the result of application of the Kately court's
definition of a user.
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ment's broad definition of the the actual cause of the death was the car's
malfunction. term user. In Gnirk, the plaintiff was the driver of a car
who witnessed the death of her child due to a defect in that car. The
court held that while South Dakota would not extend Dillon to strict
products liability cases, the plaintiff was a user who could recover for her
emotional distress. By holding that plaintiffs who fit the Restatement's
definition of users may recover for emotional distress, the court opened
the door for all users to recover for emotional injury. The court, while
obviously trying to limit a manufacturer's liability by refusing to extend
Dillon to strict liability cases, actually made it easier for many plaintiffs
to recover for emotional distress. The court's holding would allow the
hypothetical bus passengers to recover for their emotional distress caused
by witnessing a defective bus physically injure a total stranger. When the
question arises again in South Dakota, the court must recognize the
ramifications of its holding in Gnirk and address the user's recovery in a
more articulate manner than the Kately court.
It is unlikely that Illinois will take a two tier approach. In Rahn,
the Illinois court refused to extend Dillon to strict products liability
cases. Dual status plaintiffs who seek to recover based on their status as
users in Illinois will probably be unsuccessful because in addition to re-
fusing to extend Dillon, the Rahn court noted that plaintiffs in strict
products liability cases could not recover for emotional distress unac-
companied by physical injury. 66 Regardless of whether a plaintiff is char-
acterized as a Dillon bystander or a user, this would preclude recovery
for emotional distress.
B. Rationale for Recovery
Assuming that the plaintiff's status has been properly determined,
the next question must be whether strict products liability should be ex-
tended to cover this type of harm. Many courts have ignored this ques-
tion. Those courts that have found that Dillon should be extended to
strict products liability have failed to consider that the holding in Dillon
was based on the defendant's fault while strict products liability is osten-
sibly liability without fault.67 Courts that have allowed recovery for
emotional distress in strict products liability have attempted to justify the
result by citing Traynor's dissent in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. 68 for
66. Rahn v. Gerdts, 119 Ill. App. 3d 781, 784-85, 455 N.E.2d 807, 809, 74 Ill. Dec. 378, 380
(1983).
67. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (2)(a) (1965) provides that it applies even
though "the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product .. "
68. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944). The portion most frequently referred to is "it should
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the proposition that manufacturers should be held liable whenever their
product causes injury to a human being; some have cited Elmore v.
American Motors Corp. 69 for the proposition that innocent bystanders are
in need of protection. This attempted justification fails because it ignores
the possible distinction between physically injured and emotional injured
bystanders, and also fails to address the Restatement's limitation to cases
involving physical injury.70
Before looking at the arguments, both for and against extending
strict products liability to this type of harm, it must be noted that in
answering this question, we must contend with the extensions of strict
products liability that have come before, that is, there is no clean slate to
write on.
One argument that can be quickly disposed of for denying recovery
to those plaintiffs classified as Dillon bystanders is their status as bystand-
ers. Discussing recovery by physically injured bystanders, one writer ex-
pressed the view that once one accepts that privity has no place in strict
products liability, recovery by bystanders is a foregone conclusion. 71 If
privity truly has no place in this doctrine, then there is no reason to
exclude emotionally injured bystanders differently from physically in-
jured bystanders except for the nature of their injury.
A more difficult argument, however, is whether strict products lia-
bility was ever intended to cover emotional injury. The Restatement's
discussion of the history of the doctrine reveals that strict products liabil-
ity began in order to provide a remedy for physical injury, especially for
injury caused by products intimately associated with the body.72 Since
now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability when an article that he has placed
on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes
injury to human beings." 24 Cal. 2d at 461, 150 P.2d at 440 (Traynor, J. concurring).
69. 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969), The following language is frequently
relied on in cases involving physically injured bystanders:
If anything, bystanders should be entitled to greater protection than the consumer or
user where injury to bystanders from the defect is reasonably foreseeable. Consumers and
users, at least, have the opportunity to inspect for defects and to limit their purchases to
articles manufactured by reputable manufacturers and sold by reputable retailers, whereas
the bystander ordinarily has no such opportunities. In short, the bystander is in greater
need of protection from defective products which are dangerous, and if any distinction
should be made between bystanders and users, it should be made, contrary to the position
of defendants, to extend greater liability in favor of the bystanders.
70 Cal. 2d at 586, 451 P.2d at 89, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 657. This language was also relied on by the court
in Shepard v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 3d 16, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1977).
70. The R-STATEMENT (SEcoND) oF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides that "One who sells any
product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused.. . ." (emphasis added).
71. Note, Strict Products Liability to the Bystander: A Study in Common Law Determinism, 38
U. CHi. L. REV. 625 (1971).
72. RESTATEMENT (SECoND) oF TORTS § 402A Comment b (1965).
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Section 402A expressly limits recovery to physical injury, the drafters of
the Restatement seemed to exclude recovery for emotional injury. 73 This
limitation has been noted by at least one court in refusing to extend strict
products liability to cover emotional distress. 74 In those cases in which
the courts allowed the emotionally injured bystander (or, in fact, user) to
recover, no mention of this limitation was made."
This is not to suggest that strict products liability should remain a
static concept forever or that the intent of the drafters of the Restatement
to deny recovery to emotionally injured plaintiffs should bind the courts'
hands. It is meant to suggest, at least, that the courts should consider
this limitation and indicate explicitly that they are extending the cover-
age of strict products liability. Prior to Dillon, a mother who witnessed
the death of her child could not recover in negligence for her emotional
distress unless she had suffered some physical impact or was within the
zone of danger. While the historical denial of a cause of action did not
stop the Dillon court from recognizing a new one, the court did explain
its reasoning and justified its holding. 76 No less should be expected in
strict products liability.
At the time that Section 402A was drafted,77 recovery for emotional
distress, particularly that unaccompanied by physical injury was just be-
ginning.78 Given the expansion of negligence theory to cover this type of
73. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 72.
74. Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 58 Il. App. 3d 349, 374 N.E. 2d 683, 15 Ill. Dec. 900 (1978),
afld, 79 Ill. 2d 26, 402 N.E.2d 194, 37 Ill. Dec. 304 (1980).
75. No mention of this language of the RESTATEMENT regarding physical harm was made in
Kately v. Wilkinson, 148 Cal. App. 3d 576, 195 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1983); Gnirk v. Ford Motor Co., 572
F. Supp. 1201 (D.S.D. 1983); or in Walker v. Clark Equip. Co., 320 N.W.2d 561 (Iowa 1982) or in
the majority's opinion in Shepard v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 3d 16, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1977).
The meaning of the term physical harm, as used by the RESTATEMENT is not, however, crystal clear.
In Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980), the
California court overruled its previous requirement that in order to recover for emotional distress
there must also be a physical injury or physical manifestations of the emotional injury such as head-
aches or nausea. Other cases which have held that in order to recover for emotional distress, there
need be no physical injury include: Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983)(En Banc);
Shultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 131, 447 N.E.2d 109 (1983) and Culbert v. Sampson's
Supermarkets, 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982). Other jurisdictions have rejected Molien: Oberreuter v.
Orion Indus., Inc., 342 N.W.2d 492 (Iowa 1984); Payton v. Abbott Labs. 386 Mass. 540,437 N.E.2d
171 (1982) and Fournell v. Usher Pest Control Co., 208 Neb. 684, 305 N.W.2d 605 (1981).
The RESTATEMENT language could mean either that there can be no recovery for emotional
distress in strict products liability or that at least there must be physical injury in addition to the
emotional distress. If it means the former, courts must address then those cases in which a plaintiff
seeks to recover for emotional distress. This was the position taken by the dissent in Shepard v.
Superior Court. If it means the latter, the courts should explain the meaning of the RESTATEMENT
language and use it to justify their holdings.
76. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
77. 1965.
78. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965) also included Section 436A which provides
that "If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing either bodily
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injury that followed, 79 there may or may not be a reason to limit recovery
in strict products liability to cases involving physical injury, but history
or the frame of mind of the drafters of the Restatement in 1965 should
not control the law forever.80
While the intent of the drafters of the Restatement may not be an
adequate reason for declining to extend strict products liability to cover
emotional distress, the courts should still consider the rationales underly-
ing the doctrine of strict products liability to see whether such an exten-
sion is warranted. There are numerous theories advanced in support of
strict products liability and several will be examined.
One theory advanced to justify strict products liability is that when
there is a defective product, there is probably negligence somewhere.
The injured plaintiff, however, will have difficulty proving negligence,
and strict products liability is a way to ease the plaintiff's burden. 81 If a
jurisdiction takes this view, it is really saying that strict products liability
is virtually the same as negligence. The development of strict products
liability in those jurisdictions is likely to follow that of negligence. If that
jurisdiction follows Dillon in negligence cases, a Dillon type bystander
should recover for the same injury even though the case is brought under
a strict products liability theory. If the jurisdiction follows Molien in
negligence cases, again, a plaintiff who suffers the same type of injury
should be allowed to recover in strict products liability. Regardless of
whether we think that Dillon or Molien are admirable approaches or pro-
duce inconsistent results, the difficulty of applying either case is not made
more problematic if the case sounds in strict products liability.
Others take the countervailing position that strict products liability
harm or emotional disturbance to another, and it results in such emotional disturbance without
bodily harm or other compensable damage, the actor is not liable for such emotional disturbance."
Under this section, in order to recover for emotional distress, a plaintiff had to suffer physical injury
in addition to the emotional injury. The physical injury did not, however, have to be the result of a
physical impact. This view was later rejected by the California court in Molien. This Section also
appears to be adopting the zone of danger rule which was rejected by Dillon.
79. Dillon was decided three years after the RESTATEMENT, and Molien was decided 15 years
after the drafting of the RESTATEMENT.
80. Therefore, while the dissent in Shepard may be correct that strict products liability was not
intended to cover emotional distress, that reason alone is insufficient to restrict strict products liabil-
ity to cases involving a physical injury.
81. See, e.g., D. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REv.
681 (1980). One of the policies advanced for justifying strict products liability was felt to be that the
majority of accidents caused by products and that are not caused by abuse of the product are proba-
bly attributable to negligent acts by the manufacturer but the difficulties of discovering and proving
that negligence are practically insurmountable. See also, G. Schwartz, Forward: Understanding
Products Liability, 67 CAL. L. REv. 435 (1979). Mr. Schwartz notes that strict liability can be seen
as a fault rule which shifts the focus from the fault of the manufacturer (as in negligence cases) to the
fault of the product itself. In addition, strict liability could be seen as negligence in combination with
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
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is liability without fault, and is therefore different from negligence. 2 As
the dissent in Shepard pointed out, the decision in Dillon was based, at
least in part, on the defendant's fault and therefore should not be ex-
tended to strict products liability. While this argument may be emotion-
ally satisfying, it cannot ultimately be justified. That a cause of action is
based on fault or not based on fault does not automatically mean that
some injuries, such as emotional distress, should not be remediable; un-
less, we are really saying that emotional distress is not a real injury like
physical injury. Given the recognition of emotional distress as a true
injury in negligence cases, 83 there is no apparent reason for saying that
the same injury is less real when caused by a defective product. The
injury is the same regardless of the cause. But, some courts still refuse to
allow recovery when a defective product causes emotional distress. Im-
plictly, the courts are saying that they value emotional health less than
physical health. To say that a plaintiff may recover in strict products
liability without proof of fault when a physical injury occurs, but that a
plaintiff who suffers emotional distress must prove fault is to say that
emotional injury is not as deserving of a remedy as physical injury is.
Implicit in this is a distrust of emotional injury cases.
In addition, a court that requires proof of fault in emotional distress
cases but not in physical injury cases is saying that it wants more proof
before holding a manufacturer liable for emotional injury. A court may
require more strenuous proof as a matter of policy before it will allow an
emotionally injured plaintiff to recover, but if a court takes this view, it
should at least admit the true reason behind its holding: limiting a man-
ufacturer's liability.
An additional theory advanced in support of strict products liability
is that the manufacturer is in a better position to bear responsibility for
the harm than the plaintiff who must purchase the product in today's
modem world.84 Prosser phrased it as:
The public interest in human life, health and safety demands the maxi-
mum possible protection the law can give against dangerous defects in
products which consumers must buy, and against which they are help-
82. The RESTATEMENT provides that strict liability is applicable even though the manufacturer
has exercised all possible care, that is, was not negligent. See also, J. Henderson, Extending the
Boundaries of Strict Products Liability: Implications of the Theory of the Second Best, 128 U. PA. L.
REV. 1036 (1980). One theory noted by Mr. Henderson is that because manufacturers profit from
their activities, fairness requires that innocent victims be compensated for injuries caused by defec-
tive products regardless of the supplier's fault.
83. This expansion can be seen in Dillon v. Legg, Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., Shepard v.
Superior Court, and Walker v. Clark Equip. Co..
84. See, e.g., D. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV.
681 (1980).
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less to protect themselves; and it justifies the imposition, upon all sup-
pliers of such products, the full responsibility for the harm they cause,
even though the supplier has not been negligent.85
If we accept the notion that physically injured bystanders can recover,8 6
and if we believe that emotional injury is a real injury, then this rationale
supports recovery by emotionally injured plaintiffs in strict products lia-
bility. Emotionally injured plaintiffs, no less than physically injured
ones, are true innocent victims and are unable to protect themselves from
unsafe products.
The rationale that a seller, who represents to the public that the
product is safe for use and induces that belief, should be held responsible
when a consumer relies on representations8 7 can be readily applied to
emotionally injured Kately users. If the plaintiff is a Kately user, that
user may indeed have relied on representations of safety. As the respon-
sible purchaser and operator of the product, like Mrs. Kately, the user
may feel responsibility and guilt when the product causes injury to an-
other. It is more difficult to apply this rationale to all other users within
the Restatement's definition, such as the bus passengers, because no rep-
resentations of safety were ever made to them. Since this rationale has
not been an obstacle in applying strict products liability to users to whom
no representations of safety were ever made when those users suffer phys-
ical injury, users in the same position who suffer emotional injury should
also be able to recover. The same could be said of bystanders. This ra-
tionale was not an obstacle to recovery by physically injured bystanders
and it would be hypocritical for the courts to dredge up this rationale
now to deny recovery to emotionally injured bystanders.
There may be a reason to use an aspect of this rationale to argue
that emotionally injured plaintiffs should not be able to recover. Closely
tied to this rationale of reliance on representations of safety is the lan-
guage of the Restatement that defines a defective product.8 8 According
85. W. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel Strict Liability to the Consumer, 69 YALE L.J.
1099, 1122 (1960).
86. See Note, Strict Products Liability to the Bystander: A Study in Common Law Determinism,
38 U. CHI. L. REV. 625 (1971). See also Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451
P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969) and cases cited supra, at note 11.
87. See, eg., D. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability Law, 33 VAND. L.
REv. 681 (1980). The author indicated that manufacturers could be held liable on a strict liability
theory because they convey to the public a general sense of product quality by the use of mass
advertising and by merchandising practices. These, according to Owen, cause consumers to rely on
the manufacturer's skill and expertise for protection. In J. Henderson, Extending the Boundaries of
Strict Products Liability: Implications of the Theory of the Second Best, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1036
(1980), Mr. Henderson noted that consumers rely on manufacturers and suppliers for adequate pro-
tection and that these consumers should be allowed to recover when adequate protection is not
provided.
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A Comment g (1965). See also G. Schwartz,
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to the Restatement, a product is defective if it is unreasonably dangerous;
that is, dangerous beyond that contemplated by the ordinary consumer.
A physically injured user could say that defective brakes were beyond the
danger contemplated. Even though a physically injured bystander has
had no representations of safety made to him or her, a bystander could
argue that he or she expected to walk safely down a street and not be hit
by a car with defective brakes. Alternatively, even though it is a by-
stander who is physically injured, the user of the car could say that there
was an expectation that the brakes would not fail and injure an innocent
victim. A user could purchase a car with this expectation. Therefore, in
cases involving physical injury, it is arguable that the defect in the prod-
uct did present a danger beyond that contemplated by the user or by-
stander. However, in cases involving emotional distress, the argument
falters. Whose expectations do we look to ascertain if the product was
unreasonably dangerous? It seems somewhat disingenuous to argue that
anyone ever thought about the danger of a product causing physical in-
jury which in turn would cause emotional distress to someone else. We
must wonder if the risk of emotional distress is what is meant by a danger
beyond that contemplated by the ordinary consumer.
Other commentators have espoused a risk of loss spreading rationale
in support of strict products liability.89 Under this theory, manufactur-
ers absorb the loss and then spread it out among all of the consumers of
their product. This would support recovery by some users, those who
purchased the product, because the loss would be spread among all con-
sumers regardless of the fact that the loss was due to physical or emo-
tional injury.
It is more difficult to apply this rationale to support recovery for
emotional injury by non-users: Dillon type bystanders in strict products
liability. When a non-consumer recovers, the loss is spread among con-
sumers only and some might say that it is unfair to make consumers pay
for this type of loss. There are two reasons why this argument will not
stand up. First, this argument was unsuccessful in preventing recovery
by physically injured bystanders. Once this argument failed to prevent
physically injured bystanders from recovering, there is no reason for it to
Understanding Products Liability, 67 CAL. L. REv. 435 (1979). In discussing recovery by bystand-
ers, Mr. Schwartz explores the concept of consumer expectations and concludes that the purchaser
of the product may have intended to provide some protection to victims of the product.
89. See, e.g., D. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV.
681 (1980) and J. Henderson, Extending the Boundaries of Strict Products Liability: Implications of
the Theory of the Second Best, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1036 (1980).
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be successful in preventing recovery in emotional injury cases.9° Second,
in emotional injury cases in strict products liability, at least some of the
plaintiffs will also be users and consumers of the product. Even if al-
lowing recovery by plaintiffs who are only Dillon type bystanders will
spread the rule of loss unfairly on consumers, this unfairness is lessened
by the existence of some emotionally injured plaintiffs who are also users
or consumers.
The rationale most difficult to square with recovery by emotionally
injured bystanders is the ease of litigation theory. Those advancing this
theory argue that since a user could already sue the retailer on warranty
theories and the retailer could seek indemnity from those up the chain, it
is easier to just let the plaintiff sue any supplier in the chain. While this
theory would support recovery by emotionally injured users, it does not
work well for emotionally injured bystanders. Again, however, this did
not prevent the courts from allowing recovery by physically injured by-
standers from recovering and unless there is something different about
emotionally injured bystanders, courts should not hide behind this ra-
tionale to bar recovery to Dillon type bystanders who sue in strict prod-
ucts liability.
In summary, because many of the rationales underlying strict prod-
ucts liability were ignored when courts extended this cause of action to
physically injured bystanders, courts should refuse to use these rationales
to bar recovery by plaintiffs who suffer emotional distress by witnessing a
defective product cause physical injury to another. To do so would be
hypocritical at best.
V. CONCLUSION
Defendants in strict products liability cases can do little to protect
themselves from liability to emotionally injured plaintiffs other than to
argue that because strict products liability is liability without fault, the
courts should not extend Dillon to strict products liability. In addition,
future defendants may argue that strict products liability should not be
extended to cover emotional distress even if the plaintiff is classified as a
user. While these arguments have some appeal, they will not be success-
ful in a jurisdiction that believes that emotional injury is as deserving of
redress as physical injury. Lest this seem unfair to manufacturers, there
remain many restraints on the Dillon cause of action in those jurisdic-
tions that recognize it. Defendants should also argue that the definition
90. In the leading case of Elmore v. American Motors Corp., this theory was not even
discussed.
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of a user be limited as in Kately. Using this definition will impose some
restraints on user recovery. Most important, however, is that there will
be no recovery unless the product is defective. Plaintiffs who see some-
one injured by mishandling or misusing a product will not recover. Mis-
use of a product is a defense to a suit in products liability because it
means that the product is not defective. It is only when a product's de-
fect causes the injury that an emotionally injured plaintiff can recover. If
the manufacturer can prevent the defect from existing, the product can
result in neither physical nor emotional injury. In other words, to avoid
suits for emotional injury, manufacturers need only do the same as they
would to avoid suits for physical injury.
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